Introduction
Active Directory remains the heart of most corporate infrastructures. It controls identities, permissions, policies, access to resources, and the trust relationships between systems. It also remains the preferred target of attackers who gain initial access to an environment.
The question any mature security program should answer often is straightforward: if someone gains a foothold in the network, how far can they get before being detected?
YAGA, the penetration testing agent developed by HackerSec, was built to answer this question autonomously, continuously and in a chained fashion, operating inside the infrastructure as an agent that thinks in progression, not in isolated checks.
The problem with point-in-time AD assessments
Active Directory tests performed once or twice a year capture the state of the environment at that moment. Configurations change. New accounts are created. Delegations are added. Groups grow. Automation scripts leave traces. Policies are altered without a security review.
Between one test and the next, the attack surface evolves silently.
YAGA operates in that interval, ensuring the environment is assessed continuously, that security regressions are detected quickly, and that the path to the Domain Controller is mapped before a real attacker discovers it.
Operating architecture in AD environments
YAGA does not enter an Active Directory environment like a scanner firing requests in bulk. It operates as an agent with contextual reasoning, progressively building its understanding of the environment before moving on to exploitation phases.
The operating architecture in AD is organized into layers that feed each other sequentially and in parallel:
Domain reconnaissance layer
The agent starts by understanding the structure. Which domains exist, how they relate, which trusts are established, the topology of sites and services, which domain controllers are active, and how the DNS infrastructure is organized. This structural map is the foundation on which all following phases operate.
Object enumeration layer
With the structure mapped, YAGA enumerates the directory objects relevant to security analysis: user accounts, groups, computers, service accounts, accounts with special attributes, active GPOs and their settings, OUs, and the delegation applied at each level. Nothing is discarded in this phase. The agent builds an internal graph of the environment.
Configuration analysis layer
On top of the built graph, YAGA applies configuration analysis. Excessive delegations, misconfigured trust relationships, permissions assigned directly instead of via groups, accounts with unnecessary privileges, weak password policies, legacy attributes enabled without need. Each configuration finding is recorded with the context of where it appears in the graph.
Chained exploitation layer
With the configuration map in hand, the agent moves on to active exploitation, building progression paths based on what the environment reveals about itself.
Correlation with external stacks layer
Through YAGA's MCP integrations, AD findings are correlated with information from other sources in the environment. System logs, endpoint data, information from applications integrated with the directory, and identity context from other products broaden the agent's visibility beyond what AD itself declares about itself.
How YAGA thinks in progression within AD
The difference between an enumeration tool and an autonomous agent lies in the reasoning about what to do with what was found.
YAGA does not just list. It evaluates paths.
When the agent identifies a service account with unconstrained delegation on a specific server, it does not record the finding and move on. It evaluates that server's position in the environment, which accounts authenticate to it, the real impact of exploiting that delegation in that context, and whether there is a path from that point to higher-privilege objects.
This progression reasoning is what turns individual findings into attack chains that reflect what a real adversary would build.
Chaining tests: from the compromised account to the Domain Controller
The most common compromise path in AD environments does not start at the Domain Controller. It starts at some low-privilege point and progresses through a series of configuration decisions that, individually, look acceptable.
YAGA maps and explores these paths autonomously:
From the initial entry point to understanding the identity context
From any level of initial access, the agent begins to build its understanding of where it is in the environment. What the domain is, which account is available, which groups it belongs to, which resources are accessible with that context, and what that access reveals about the surrounding environment.
From session enumeration to mapping high-value targets
YAGA identifies where privileged accounts have active sessions. Domain administrators authenticated on ordinary workstations, high-privilege service accounts running on accessible servers, support accounts with delegated access on sensitive OUs. These targets are mapped as potential progression points.
From service configurations to privilege escalation paths
Service accounts with registered SPNs, delegation settings, ACL permissions on directory objects, and attributes that enable special behaviors are evaluated by YAGA as progression vectors. The agent builds the graph of possible paths and prioritizes those of least resistance and greatest impact.
From local escalation to lateral movement
When YAGA identifies an escalation path on a specific system, it immediately evaluates what that system represents in the broader environment. Escalation on a server that hosts delegated authentication has different implications than escalation on an isolated workstation. The agent chains the escalation with the next lateral movement step.
From lateral movement to privileged identity control
As the agent progresses through the environment, each new identity obtained expands what can be accessed and enumerated. YAGA updates its internal graph continuously, reassessing which previously inaccessible paths are now available with the new identity context.
From privileged identity to the Domain Controller
The final steps of the chain involve operations against the environment's most sensitive objects. YAGA evaluates access to the Domain Controller not as an isolated end goal, but as the demonstration that the complete chain is traversable, from the initial entry point to the highest level of domain control.
Integrations via MCP: visibility beyond the directory
Active Directory declares its structure, but doesn't tell everything. What actually happens in the environment lives in logs, in endpoint configurations, in authentication data, and in integrated systems that consume identity from the directory.
YAGA uses its MCP integrations to expand visibility beyond what AD itself exposes:
Correlation with endpoint telemetry
Behavioral data from endpoints integrated with the environment enriches the graph YAGA builds. Accounts that authenticate at unusual hours, systems that make out-of-pattern requests, processes that run with service credentials in unexpected contexts. These signals complement the directory's configuration analysis.
Integration with log sources
Authentication logs, resource access events, policy change records, and other audit data are consumed by YAGA to validate hypotheses built during enumeration. The agent cross-references what the directory says with what the logs show actually happens.
Access to AD-integrated systems
Corporate applications that delegate authentication to Active Directory frequently inherit problematic configurations from the directory. YAGA evaluates how these systems consume identity, which directory attributes they use to make authorization decisions, and where those decisions can be influenced.
Cloud and hybrid context
Environments that synchronize identity between on-premises AD and cloud identity providers create attack surfaces that extend beyond the traditional perimeter. YAGA maps these synchronization relationships and evaluates where inconsistencies between the two worlds create progression opportunities.
Configurations YAGA evaluates continuously
AD environments accumulate configuration debt over time. YAGA operates continuously over that debt, identifying where it represents real risk:
Risk categories evaluated continuously
| Category | Risk |
|---|---|
| Legacy attributes enabled | Relax modern authentication controls, opening downgrade vectors |
| Groups with excessive members | Least-privilege principle lost after years of organic growth |
| ACLs on sensitive objects | Allow modification of critical objects by accounts without justification |
| GPOs with inconsistencies | Create security differences between systems within the same domain |
| Obsolete trust relationships | Trusts that no longer reflect organizational reality but remain active |
Each of these categories is evaluated by YAGA not as a static checklist, but as a set of hypotheses about what can be done with that configuration in that specific environment.
What YAGA delivers at the end of a cycle
At the end of each assessment cycle in an AD environment, YAGA produces a consolidated view that goes beyond a list of findings:
Attack path graph
Shows the traversable routes from different entry points to high-value objectives. Each path comes with evidence of the executed steps, the findings that make it possible, and the expected impact if traversed by a real adversary.
Regression analysis
Compares the current state with previous assessments, highlighting what changed, what improved, and what regressed. Especially relevant in environments where configuration changes happen continuously without a formal security review.
Prioritization by real impact
Paths that reach the Domain Controller in a few steps get top priority, regardless of how many individual lower-severity findings exist in the environment.
Conclusion
Active Directory is not a static technology. It evolves alongside the organization, accumulating configurations, delegations, and trust relationships that are rarely reviewed as often as needed.
YAGA approaches this environment with an orchestration architecture that combines structural enumeration, configuration analysis, chained exploitation, and correlation with external sources.